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Continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols, based on Gaussian modulation of the
quadratures of coherent states, have been implemented in recent experiments. A present limitation
of such systems is the finite efficiency of the detectors, which can in principle be compensated for
by the use of classical optical preamplifiers. Here we study this possibility in detail, by deriving the
modified secret key generation rates when an optical parametric amplifier is placed at the output
of the quantum channel. After presenting a general set of security proofs, we show that the use
of preamplifiers does compensate for all the imperfections of the detectors when the amplifier is
optimal in terms of gain and noise. Imperfect amplifiers can also enhance the system performance,
under conditions which are generally satisfied in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution
(CVQKD) has been proposed in the past few years as
a promising alternative to the most commonly imple-
mented discrete-variable QKD. The CVQKD approach
has two main advantages: first, it avoids the limitations
associated with single photon counting, and second, it
offers the prospect of very high rate secure key distri-
bution. Whereas discrete-variable protocols encode the
key information in properties of single photon pulses [1],
CVQKD protocols use for the same purpose optical
variables that can take a continuous range of values,
such as the quadratures of a mode of the electromagnetic
field. The different CVQKD protocols can be roughly
categorized by the type of states, modulation, detection
system and error-correction algorithm they are employ-
ing [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Here we are interested in protocols
where Alice encodes the key information by modulating
the quadratures x and p of few-photon coherent states
with a centred Gaussian distribution [8, 9, 10]. At
the receiver’s site, Bob measures either one of the two
quadratures randomly using homodyne detection [8, 9],
or both quadratures simultaneously with heterodyne
detection, thus avoiding the need for random basis
switching [10]. In the final step of the protocol, Alice
and Bob apply a reconciliation procedure to form a
secret binary key from the continuous information they
share.
The security of the Gaussian CVQKD protocol with
homodyne detection was first proven against individ-
ual Gaussian eavesdropping attacks, using either di-
rect [8] or reverse [9] reconciliation. Security proofs were
then obtained against general individual or finite-size at-
tacks [11], and general collective attacks [12, 13, 14]. For
the protocol with heterodyne detection, the first bounds
of Eve’s accessible information in the case of individual
Gaussian attacks were provided in [10, 15], and were later
improved in [16, 17], while the case of collective attacks
was analyzed in [18]. Recently, the unconditional secu-
rity of both homodyne and heterodyne protocols has also
been proven [19].
The theoretical security for systems implementing
CVQKD protocols has therefore been proven to be max-
imal, and is not degraded by the inherent imperfections
of Bob’s detector, such as noise and inefficiency, that are
present in practical CVQKD systems. These imperfec-
tions, however, degrade the generation rate of the final
secret key. A possible way to overcome this limitation is
to use optical parametric amplifiers to boost the signal
just before detection, thus compensating at least par-
tially for detector losses [20], as has been demonstrated
experimentally, for example in [21, 22]. In the context of
quantum cryptography [3, 4], we therefore need to eval-
uate in what way the expected improvement in effective
quantum efficiency translates into an improvement in se-
cret key generation rate, based on the security proofs
mentioned above.
In this paper, we propose to insert an amplifier at the
output of the quantum channel and inside Bob’s appara-
tus, and we calculate the resulting secret key generation
rate for different cases of eavesdropping attacks. For this
purpose, we assume that Bob’s apparatus is inaccessible
to the eavesdropper, Eve. This assumption is consistent
with the idea that if Eve could indeed have access to
Bob’s setup, then she would also have access to classical
data storage, or could impersonate Bob, and the secu-
rity of the entire communication would be compromised.
Since such a situation is unacceptable for a real system,
we perform calculations under the “realistic” assumption
that the eavesdropper cannot benefit from Bob’s system
imperfections.
The paper is organized as follows: In section II, we
review the expressions of the secret key generation rate
for the homodyne protocol, and we derive corresponding
expressions for the heterodyne protocol under realistic as-
sumptions, in the case of a standard continuous-variable
QKD system with no amplifier. In section III we add in
the system an optical parametric amplifier placed at the
output of the quantum channel, and derive the modified
2secret key generation rates for the homodyne and hetero-
dyne CVQKD protocols, and for both individual and col-
lective attacks. Finally, we compare the performance of
practical systems implementing these protocols for differ-
ent configurations. In general we find that choosing the
appropriate combination of detector and amplifier allows
us to compensate for all the inherent imperfections of a
practical detector if the amplifier has a minimal noise.
We also show that a realistic noisy amplifier can also be
employed, as long as the noise of the amplifier is small rel-
ative to the noise and inefficiency of the detector, which
is generally the case in practice.
II. SECRET KEY DISTRIBUTION RATES FOR
GAUSSIAN CVQKD PROTOCOLS
In the following, we first review the basic notions re-
lated to continuous-variable QKD protocols with Gaus-
sian modulation and present the assumptions of our cal-
culations. We then derive the expressions of the secret
key generation rate for these protocols when homodyne
or heterodyne detectors are used, and for the case of in-
dividual or collective eavesdropping attacks. The tools
that we present here will be essential for the calculations
in the next section, which take into account the use of
amplifiers to compensate for detector imperfections and
thus enhance the performance of CVQKD systems.
A. Notations and assumptions
The standard prepare-and-measure description of the
CVQKD protocol with Gaussian modulation of coherent
states was briefly presented in the introduction. In more
detail, the quantum transmission phase of the communi-
cation between Alice and Bob is described as follows:
• For each generated pulse, Alice randomly chooses
two values for the in-phase quadrature xA and the
orthogonal quadrature pA from a Gaussian distri-
bution centred at zero and of variance VAN0, where
N0 is the shot noise variance. She then prepares a
coherent state centred at (xA, pA) and sends it to
Bob through the quantum channel. The channel
features a transmission efficiency T and an excess
noise ε, resulting in a noise variance at Bob’s in-
put of (1 + Tε)N0. The total channel-added noise
referred to the channel input, expressed in shot
noise units, is defined as χline = (1 + Tε)/T − 1 =
1/T − 1 + ε.
• When Bob receives the modulated coherent state,
he measures either one of the two quadratures ran-
domly (homodyne case) or both quadratures simul-
taneously (heterodyne case). A practical detec-
tor is characterized by an efficiency η and a noise
vel due to detector electronics. As we did for the
channel, we can define a detection-added noise re-
ferred to Bob’s input and expressed in shot-noise
units that we denote in general as χh, and is given
by the expressions χhom = [(1 − η) + vel]/η and
χhet = [1 + (1 − η) + 2vel]/η for homodyne and
heterodyne detection, respectively. The total noise
referred to the channel input can then be expressed
as χtot = χline + χh/T .
The prepare-and-measure description presented above
is equivalent to the entanglement-based scheme shown
in figure 1. This equivalence is at the heart of security
proofs for this type of CVQKD protocols and has been
explained in detail in [14, 18, 23]. In this scheme:
• The coherent state preparation by Alice is mod-
eled by a heterodyne measurement of one half of
a two-mode squeezed vacuum (EPR) state of vari-
ance V = VA + 1. The other half of the EPR state
is sent to Bob through the quantum channel.
• Bob’s detector inefficiency is modeled by a beam-
splitter with transmission η, while its electronic
noise vel is modeled by an EPR state of variance
v, one half of which is entering the second input
port of the beamsplitter, as shown in figure 1. The
variance v is chosen to obtain the appropriate ex-
pression of χh, in the following way: for homodyne
detection, v = ηχhom/(1− η) = 1+ vel/(1− η), and
for heterodyne detection, v = (ηχhet− 1)/(1− η) =
1 + 2vel/(1 − η), where the 1 in the numerator
(ηχhet − 1) of the last expression is subtracted due
to the unit of shot noise already introduced by the
heterodyne detection.
Once the quantum transmission phase of the commu-
nication has ended, Alice and Bob proceed with classical
data processing procedures, which include a reconcilia-
tion algorithm to extract an identical chain of bits from
their correlated continuous data, and a standard privacy
amplification process to derive a final secret key from this
chain. The reconciliation is direct when Alice’s data is
used as a reference for establishing the key and reverse
when the reference is Bob’s data. Reverse reconciliation
has been shown to offer a great advantage in QKD sys-
tem performance [9], therefore calculations in this paper
have been performed for this case. Direct reconciliation
expressions can be derived using similar tools as the ones
presented here.
Under the assumptions that we have described, we
want to calculate the secret key generation rates for the
Gaussian coherent-state CVQKD protocol with homo-
dyne and heterodyne detection, for the case of individual
and collective eavesdropping attacks. These are consid-
ered to be Gaussian attacks, which have been shown to
be optimal [12, 13]. In the case of individual attacks, Eve
is authorized to interact individually with each coherent-
state pulse sent by Alice, store her ancillae in a quantum
memory, and perform measurements on them after sift-
ing (for example, in the case of homodyne detection, after
3Bob has revealed the quadrature he chose to measure),
but before the reconciliation phase. In the case of col-
lective attacks, Eve interacts individually with each pulse
but is allowed to wait for the entire classical procedure to
end before performing the best possible collective mea-
surement on her ensemble of stored ancillae. The maxi-
mum information on Bob’s key available to Eve is limited
by the Shannon bound IBE [24, 25] for individual attacks
and by the Holevo bound χBE [26] for collective attacks.
In the following, we will derive expressions for IBE and
χBE as a function of system parameters. Then, from an
information-theoretic perspective, the secret key infor-
mation that Alice and Bob can distill is defined, in the
case of reverse reconciliation, as ∆IShannon = IAB−IBE for
individual and ∆IHolevo = IAB−χBE for collective attacks,
where IAB is the information shared between Alice and
Bob.
It is important to note that the security of the CVQKD
protocols against coherent attacks has recently been
proven [19]. Coherent attacks are the most powerful at-
tacks allowed by quantum mechanics. They allow Eve
to interact collectively with all the pulses sent by Alice
and perform joint measurements on her ancillae after the
entire quantum and classical communication. The secu-
rity proofs show that the derived bounds for the secret
key generation rate in the case of collective attacks re-
main asymptotically valid for arbitrary coherent attacks.
Therefore, the results that we derive in the following sec-
tions for collective attacks are valid for coherent attacks
as well, guaranteeing the unconditional security of the
corresponding QKD systems.
B. Individual attacks
Homodyne detection case: The mutual informa-
tion of Alice and Bob, IAB, is derived from Bob’s mea-
sured variance VB = ηT (V + χtot) and the conditional
variance VB|A = ηT (1 + χtot) using Shannon’s equation:
Ihom
AB
=
1
2
log2
VB
VB|A
=
1
2
log2
V + χtot
1 + χtot
(1)
Eve’s information on Bob’s measured quadrature, IBE,
is also derived using Shannon’s equation in the case of
individual attacks [11]. For reverse reconciliation and
under the assumption that Eve cannot benefit from the
detection-added noise, VB|E = η
[
1
T (1/V+χline)
+ χhom
]
,
and therefore [14]
Ihom
BE
=
1
2
log2
VB
VB|E
=
T 2(V + χtot)(1/V + χline)
1 + Tχhom(1/V + χline)
(2)
The Shannon secret key generation rate is then given by
∆Ihom
Shannon
= Ihom
AB
− Ihom
BE
.
Heterodyne detection case: It is straightforward
to derive the mutual information of Alice and Bob for
the case of two measured quadratures:
Ihet
AB
= 2× 1
2
log2
VB
VB|A
= log2
V + χtot
1 + χtot
(3)
where here VB = ηT (V + χtot)/2, VB|A = ηT (1 + χtot)/2,
and χtot takes the appropriate expression for heterodyne
detection (section IIA).
The information that Eve gains on Bob’s data given
that both quadratures are measured is given by Ihet
BE
=
log2(VB/VB|E). A bound on VB|E when Eve is allowed
to have access to Bob’s setup has been calculated in [16,
17]. It is given by the expression VB|E =
(
V xE+1
V+xE
+ 1
)
/2,
where xE = T (2− ε)2/(
√
2− 2T + Tε+√ε)2 + 1 [16].
To extend this bound to a more realistic scenario, we
need to take into account the fact that the detection is
not accessible to Eve, and only adds noise that is not
correlated to the signal. The corresponding signal-noise
commutators are therefore all zero, and the calculation
is equivalent to correcting the various variances that in-
tervene in the expressions, to account for the detection
parameters. We then find VB|E = η
(
V xE+1
V+xE
+ χhet
)
/2,
where xE is the same as above. Putting things together,
Eve’s information is in this case given by the following
expression:
Ihet
BE
= log2
VB
VB|E
= log2
T (V + χtot)(V + xE)
V xE + 1 + χhet(V + xE)
(4)
The Shannon secret key generation rate ∆Ihet
Shannon
is then
calculated from (3) and (4).
C. Collective attacks
For convenience, we consider in this section the ho-
modyne and heterodyne cases in parallel. The mutual
information between Alice and Bob is given in the case
of collective attacks by the same expressions as for in-
dividual attacks, namely (1) and (3) for homodyne and
heterodyne detection, respectively. Deriving Eve’s infor-
mation on Bob’s measurements, on the other hand, re-
quires a different approach that has been developed in
detail in [14, 18] for the homodyne detection case. Below
we present the main ideas of this technique and extend
it to the heterodyne detection case.
The maximum information available to Eve on Bob’s
key is bounded by the Holevo quantity [27]
χBE = S(ρE)−
∫
dmB p(mB) S(ρ
mB
E
) (5)
where mB represents the measurement of Bob, and it can
take the form mB = xB (dmB = dxB) for a homodyne
detector or the form mB = xB, pB (dmB = dxBdpB) for
a heterodyne detector. Also, p(mB) is the probability
density of the measurement, ρmB
E
is the eavesdropper’s
state conditional on Bob’s measurement result, and S is
the Von Neumann entropy of the quantum state ρ.
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FIG. 1: Entanglement-based scheme of a Gaussian coherent-state CVQKD protocol with homodyne or heterodyne detection.
The transmission T and channel-added noise χline are controlled by Eve, who however does not have access to Bob’s detection
apparatus.
Using the fact that Eve’s system purifies the system
AB1, that Bob’s measurement purifies the system AEFG
(see figure 1 for mode notation), and that S(ρmB
AFG
) is inde-
pendent of mB for Gaussian protocols, χBE becomes [14]:
χBE = S(ρAB1)− S(ρmBAFG) (6)
Since it has been shown that Gaussian attacks are opti-
mal for collective attacks [12, 13], it is enough to consider
Gaussian states, in which case the expressions for the en-
tropies can be further simplified as follows:
χBE =
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
−
5∑
i=3
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
(7)
where G(x) = (x + 1) log2(x + 1) − x log2 x, λ1,2 are
the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix γAB1
characterizing the state ρAB1 , and λ3,4,5 are the symplec-
tic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix γmB
AFG
character-
izing the state ρmB
AFG
after Bob’s projective measurement.
The covariance matrix γAB1 only depends on the sys-
tem including Alice and the quantum channel, therefore
the first part of (7) is the same for the homodyne and
heterodyne cases. The matrix is written as
γAB1 =
[
γA σ
T
AB1
σAB1 γB1
]
(8)
=
[
V · 1 2
√
T (V 2 − 1) · σz√
T (V 2 − 1) · σz T (V + χline) · 1 2
]
where 1 2 is the 2×2 identity matrix and σz =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
.
The symplectic eigenvalues λ1,2 ≥ 1 of the above matrix
are given by
λ21,2 =
1
2
[
A±
√
A2 − 4B
]
, with (9)
A = V 2(1− 2T ) + 2T + T 2(V + χline)2
B = T 2(V χline + 1)
2
To calculate the second part of (7), we need to find
the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix γmB
AFG
,
which can be written as
γmB
AFG
= γAFG − σTAFGB3HσAFGB3 (10)
In the above equation, H is the symplectic matrix that
represents the homodyne or heterodyne measurement on
mode B3. In the former case, Hhom = (XγB3X)
MP,
where X =
[
1 0
0 0
]
and MP stands for the Moore-
Penrose pseudo-inverse of a matrix, while in the latter
case, Hhet = (γB3 + 1 2)
−1 [18]. The matrices γB3 , γAFG,
and σAFGB3 can all be derived from the decomposition of
the covariance matrix:
γAFGB3 =
[
γAFG σ
T
AFGB3
σAFGB3 γB3
]
(11)
The above matrix can be derived with appropriate rear-
rangement of lines and columns from the matrix describ-
ing the system AB3FG (figure 1):
γAB3FG = (Y
BS)T [γAB1 ⊕ γF0G]Y BS (12)
Here, γAB1(= γAB2) is given in (8), while γF0G is the ma-
trix that describes the EPR state of variance v used to
model the detector’s electronic noise. It is written as
γF0G =
[
v · 1 2
√
(v2 − 1) · σz√
(v2 − 1) · σz v · 1 2
]
(13)
where v takes the appropriate value for the homodyne or
heterodyne detection case (section IIA). Finally, the ma-
trix Y BS describes the beamsplitter transformation that
models the inefficiency of the detector and acts on modes
B2 and F0. It is given by the expression:
Y BS = 1 A ⊕ Y BSB2F0 ⊕ 1 G, with (14)
Y BS
B2F0
=
[ √
η · 1 2
√
1− η · 1 2
−√1− η · 1 2 √η · 1 2
]
We now have all the elements required to proceed to
the calculation of the symplectic eigenvalues λ3,4,5. For
5both homodyne and heterodyne cases, we find that the
eigenvalues λ3,4 ≥ 1 are given by expressions of the form
λ23,4 =
1
2
[
C ±
√
C2 − 4D
]
(15)
where for the homodyne case [14],
Chom =
Aχhom + V
√
B + T (V + χline)
T (V + χtot)
(16)
Dhom =
√
B
V +
√
Bχhom
T (V + χtot)
and for the heterodyne case,
Chet =
1
(T (V + χtot))2
[
Aχ2
het
+B + 1+ (17)
+2χhet(V
√
B + T (V + χline)) + 2T (V
2 − 1)
]
Dhet =
(
V +
√
Bχhet
T (V + χtot)
)2
where A,B are given in (9). The last symplectic eigen-
value is λ5 = 1 for both cases. Based on (7), (9),
(15), (16), and (17), we calculate the Holevo information
bound χBE and thus derive the Holevo secret key genera-
tion rate ∆Ihom
Holevo
= Ihom
AB
−χhom
BE
and ∆Ihet
Holevo
= Ihet
AB
−χhet
BE
for homodyne and heterodyne detection, respectively.
III. ADDING AN AMPLIFIER TO
COMPENSATE FOR DETECTOR
IMPERFECTIONS
In the practical case that we are considering, where
Bob’s detection apparatus has inherent imperfections
that degrade the secret key generation rate, it is impor-
tant to consider ways of overcoming this limitation by
compensating for these imperfections. To this end, the
use of optical parametric amplifiers, practical and thor-
oughly studied devices, appears as a natural choice [3].
Under the realistic assumption that the amplifier is not
available to the eavesdropper, its use can allow Bob to
compensate fully or partially for the losses that occur
after the output of the amplifier, and thus enhance the
system performance in terms of secret key distribution
rate and maximal communication distance.
In the following, we first provide models for two types
of classical amplifiers and then combine these models
with the calculations of section II to derive the modified
secret key generation rates for Gaussian coherent-state
CVQKD protocols with homodyne and heterodyne de-
tection, and for individual and collective eavesdropping
attacks, when a classical amplifier is placed at the input
of Bob’s apparatus. We also apply the results to practi-
cal systems and compare their performance for detectors
and amplifiers with different characteristics.
A. Amplifier models
Because of their importance for various technological
applications including communication systems, optical
amplifiers and their noise characteristics have been
studied extensively [28]. Here we consider two types
of amplifiers, an ideal phase-sensitive amplifier and a
practical phase-insensitive amplifier.
Phase-sensitive amplifier: The phase-sensitive am-
plifier (PSA) is a degenerate optical parametric ampli-
fier that ideally permits noiseless amplification of a cho-
sen quadrature. It is described by the transformations
xS → √gxS, pS → pS/√g, where g > 1 is the gain of the
amplification and xS, pS are the two quadratures of the
signal mode. Therefore, the amplification process has an
asymmetric effect on the quadratures, with the in-phase
one being amplified and the orthogonal one squeezed. A
realistic amplifier can also add noise to this process but
this effect is neglected here.
Modeling this type of amplifier for our purposes is
straightforward. The model is shown in figure 2(a),
where the mode notation refers to figure 1.
Phase-insensitive amplifier: The phase-insensitive
amplifier (PIA) is a non-degenerate optical paramet-
ric amplifier, which is described by the transformations
xS → √gxS +
√
g − 1xI, pS → √gpS −
√
g − 1pI, and
xI → √gxI +
√
g − 1xS, pI → √gpI −
√
g − 1pS. Here,
g > 1 is again the gain of amplification, while S and I de-
note the signal mode and an idler mode that is ideally in a
vacuum state or, in a more realistic setting, in a state fea-
turing a noise variance VI = N > 1 (in shot-noise units).
Therefore, this type of amplifier amplifies symmetrically
both quadratures but the amplification process is asso-
ciated with a fundamental excess noise that arises from
the coupling of the signal input to the internal modes
B1
Eve Bob
B2x x
p p
g
g
→
→
B1
Eve I
I0
EPR
N
J
Bob
B2
g ; g-1
(a)
(b)
FIG. 2: Model for (a) an ideal phase-sensitive and (b) a prac-
tical phase-insensitive amplifier, placed at the output of the
quantum channel and inside Bob’s apparatus.
6of the amplifier [28, 29]. When these are in a vacuum
state, N = 1 and the phase-insensitive amplifier adds a
minimal noise for a given gain g. Such an amplifier can
be approximated in practice using nonlinear processes in
optical crystals [29, 30] or doped optical fibres [31].
Figure 2(b) shows the model for the phase-insensitive
amplifier. It consists of a noiseless amplifier that applies
the appropriate gain factor to each input mode and an
EPR state of variance N , one half of which is entering
the amplifier’s second input port, and which serves the
purpose of modeling the amplifier’s inherent noise.
B. Modified secret key generation rates
Considering the characteristics of the homodyne and
heterodyne detectors on the one hand and of the phase-
sensitive and phase-insensitive amplifiers on the other, it
is natural to expect that certain configurations are better
adapted than others. Indeed, the symmetrical ampli-
fying effect of a phase-insensitive amplifier on the two
quadratures of its input mode appears to be more suit-
able for a heterodyne detector where both quadratures
are measured, while the single measured quadrature of a
homodyne detector can benefit from the ideally noiseless
amplification induced by a phase-sensitive amplifier. We
expect then that these two configurations can result
in a significantly improved performance of the corre-
sponding CVQKD systems. Consequently, we provide
an analysis for these two cases in this section, leav-
ing the other two possible combinations for the appendix.
Homodyne detection and phase-sensitive ampli-
fier case: We start our analysis with the case of col-
lective attacks when the ideal phase-sensitive amplifier
described before is inserted into a CVQKD system with
homodyne detection.
As we mentioned in section II C, the information that
Eve has gained on Bob’s key is given by (7). The first
part of this equation does not depend on Bob’s setup,
and therefore the results of (9) remain unchanged for all
cases. For the second part of (7), we need to calculate
the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix γxB
AFG
.
This calculation leads to the matrix γAB3FG of (12), which
is now written as follows:
γAB3FG = (Y
BS)T (Y PSA)T [γAB1 ⊕ γF0G]Y PSAY BS (18)
In the above equation, the matrices Y BS, γAB1 , γF0G are
given in section II C, while the matrix Y PSA describes
the transformation induced on mode B1 by the phase-
sensitive amplifier:
Y PSA = 1 A ⊕ Y PSAB1 ⊕ 1 F0 ⊕ 1 G, with (19)
Y PSA
B1
=
[ √
g 0
0 1/
√
g
]
It is now straightforward to derive the modified symplec-
tic eigenvalues. We find that these are actually given
again by the expressions of (15), (16), with the only dif-
ference that the detection-added noise χhom (and conse-
quently the total noise χtot) is conveniently modified to
include the effect of the amplifier:
χPSA
hom
=
(1− η) + vel
gη
(20)
It is important to note that we have implicitly assumed
that Bob always amplifies the quadrature that he has ran-
domly chosen to measure: this is clearly advantageous for
him, and in theory straightforward to achieve. However,
this requires in practice to phase lock the optical beam
pumping the amplifier and the local oscillator of the ho-
modyne detection, which may not be easy to implement.
Concerning the mutual information between Eve and
Bob for the case of individual attacks, as well as the
information shared between Alice and Bob, we find that
the expressions of (1) and (2) remain valid with χhom
and χtot modified as in (20).
Heterodyne detection and phase-insensitive
amplifier case: As with the previous case, we follow
the analysis of section II C for collective attacks, but for
heterodyne detection and with a phase-insensitive ampli-
fier placed at the output of the quantum channel.
It is clear from figure 2(b) that in order to take into
account the amplifier-added noise in this case, two addi-
tional modes I and J need to be included in the calcu-
lation. Then, χBE is calculated from the following equa-
tions that replace (6) and (7):
χBE = S(ρAB1)− S(ρxB,pBAIJFG ) (21)
χBE =
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
−
7∑
i=3
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
(22)
It is therefore necessary to derive the symplectic eigen-
values of the 5-mode covariance matrix γxB,pBAIJFG , which in-
volves the solution of a polynomial of degree 5. Proceed-
ing as in section II C, we write
γxB,pB
AIJFG
= γAIJFG − σTAIJFGB3HhetσAIJFGB3 (23)
where Hhet = (γB3 + 1 2)
−1. The identity matrix in this
expression represents the beamsplitter included in the
heterodyne detector. As in (11), the matrices in this
equation can be derived from the decomposition of the
matrix γAIJFGB3 , which can in its turn be derived by first
calculating the matrix (see figures 1 and 2(b) for mode
notation)
γAB2IJF0G = (Y
PIA)T [γAB1 ⊕ γI0J ⊕ γF0G]Y PIA (24)
then rearranging it to obtain γAB2F0IJG, and finally calcu-
lating
γAB3FIJG = (Y
BS)TγAB2F0IJGY
BS (25)
to obtain the desired result by a last rearrangement
of matrix lines and columns. In the above equations,
7γAB1 and γF0G are known from (8) and (13), while the
beamsplitter transformation is now written as Y BS =
1 A⊕ Y BSB2F0 ⊕ 1 I⊕ 1 J⊕ 1 G to account for the new modes.
Furthermore, the matrix γI0J describes the EPR state of
variance N used to model the amplifier’s inherent noise,
and is written as
γI0J =
[
N · 1 2
√
N2 − 1 · σz√
N2 − 1 · σz N · 1 2
]
(26)
Finally, the transformation induced by the phase-
insensitive amplifier on modes B1 and I0 is described by
the matrix:
Y PIA = 1 A ⊕ Y PIAB1I0 ⊕ 1 J ⊕ 1 F0 ⊕ 1 G, with (27)
Y PIA
B1I0
=
[ √
g · 1 2
√
g − 1 · σz√
g − 1 · σz √g · 1 2
]
Based on the above additional elements, a rather com-
plicated but straightforward calculation leads to the ex-
pressions of (15), (17) for the symplectic eigenvalues λ3,4,
while λ5,6,7 = 1. Similarly to the case of homodyne
detection with a phase-sensitive amplifier, the effect of
the phase-insensitive amplifier can be incorporated into
a modified heterodyne detection-added noise:
χPIA
het
=
1 + (1− η) + 2vel +N(g − 1)η
gη
(28)
For individual attacks, as in the previous case, the
Shannon expressions of (3) and (4) remain the same with
χhet and χtot modified as in (28).
C. Application to practical systems
In this section, we apply the results derived in sec-
tion III B to practical QKD systems in order to compare
their performance for different configurations. In par-
ticular, we calculate the secret key generation rate as a
function of distance for fibre-optic implementations of the
Gaussian coherent-state CVQKD protocol, for individual
or collective eavesdropping attacks, in two possible con-
figurations: homodyne detection with a phase-sensitive
amplifier placed at the output of the quantum channel,
and heterodyne detection with a phase-insensitive ampli-
fier included in the system. The remaining two detector-
amplifier configurations are discussed in the appendix.
The parameters that intervene in the equations that
we derived in the previous sections are the variance of
Alice’s modulation VA, the transmission efficiency T and
excess noise ε of the quantum channel, the efficiency η
and electronic noise vel of the detector, the gain g and
potentially the noise N of the amplifier. The parame-
ters ε, η, and vel are fixed in all simulations to the values
ε = 0.005 (in shot-noise units), η = 0.6, and vel = 0.05 (in
shot-noise units), which are standard in CVQKD exper-
iments [14]. The gain of the amplifier g takes the values
1 (equivalent to no amplifier), 3, or 20, while we set the
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FIG. 3: Secret key generation rate as a function of distance
for a protocol with homodyne detection and a phase-sensitive
amplifier, in the case of collective (main figure) and individ-
ual (inset) eavesdropping attacks. The ‘perfect’ curve corre-
sponds to a perfect homodyne detector (η = 1, vel = 0) and
no amplifier.
noise of the phase-insensitive amplifier N to either 1 for
minimal (vacuum) noise, or to the more realistic value
1.5 (in shot-noise units, referred to the input). Further-
more, the channel transmission efficiency is written as
T = 10−αL/10, where α = 0.2 dB/km is the loss coeffi-
cient of optical fibres, and L is the length of the channel,
as a function of which we calculate the secret key gener-
ation rate. Finally, the modulation variance VA is linked
to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) via Shannon’s equation
as follows:
Ihom
AB
=
1
2
log2(1 + SNR) =
1
2
log2
V + χtot
1 + χtot
(29)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
VA
1 + χtot
)
→ VA = SNR(1 + χtot)
In the following simulations, we use the SNR as an
adjustable parameter, with respect to which we numer-
ically optimize the secret key generation rate for each
distance. In this way, we find for each channel length
the optimal modulation variance that maximizes the rate
given specific system parameters. This optimization is
easy to achieve in practical systems because it is in gen-
eral straightforward to dynamically adjust VA. The SNR
range used for the optimization is [0.5;15], which corre-
sponds to values that can be easily reached in practical
systems.
In addition to the parameters mentioned above, we also
take into account the fact that the reconciliation phase
of the QKD protocol has in practical systems a finite
efficiency. This effect is typically included using a recon-
ciliation efficiency parameter β that degrades in all cases
the secret key generation rate as ∆IShannon = βIAB − IBE,
or ∆IHolevo = βIAB−χBE. Our empirical work has shown
that the maximal practically attainable β depends on the
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FIG. 4: Secret key generation rate as a function of distance for
a protocol with heterodyne detection and a phase-insensitive
amplifier, for collective and individual attacks. The ‘perfect’
curve corresponds again to a perfect heterodyne detector (η =
1, vel = 0) and no amplifier. The amplifier can be either
optimal (N = 1, dashed lines), or realistic (N = 1.5, full
lines).
SNR (see figure 4 in [14]). For optimization purposes, we
have approximated this dependence with the following
analytical function:
β =
log(1 + SNR1.2)
1.29 log(1 + SNR)
+ 0.02 (30)
This function reflects the fact that high reconciliation
efficiency can be achieved when working at high SNR,
while operating the system at lower SNR values results in
a lower reconciliation efficiency. In the SNR range [0.5;15]
that we are using, β is an increasing function of SNR,
while the maximal available secret key rates IAB − IBE
or IAB − χBE are decreasing functions of SNR [32]. In
order to extract the optimal secret key generation rate
at a given distance, it is therefore necessary to realize a
non-trivial optimization with respect to the SNR.
The simulation results are shown in figures 3 and 4
for the two cases presented in section III B, respectively.
We observe that in both cases the effect of the amplifier
on the system performance may have a different scale
but is essentially the same for collective and individual
attacks. Furthermore, the larger the amplification gain
the more pronounced this effect is, while in the case of a
phase-insensitive amplifier an additional noise naturally
degrades the secret key generation rate.
A close examination of the modified detection-added
noise expressions derived in section III B can facilitate
the interpretation of the results. More specifically, start-
ing from (20) for the case of homodyne detection with
a phase-sensitive amplifier, we observe that in the limit
of large amplification gain this expression tends to zero.
Therefore, an ideal phase-sensitive amplifier can compen-
sate for all the imperfections of a practical homodyne
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
101
Distance (km)
Se
cr
et
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ra
te
 (b
it/p
uls
e)
0 10 20 30 40 50
10−2
100
Heterodyne                    Homodyne
Individual attacksCollective attacks
FIG. 5: Secret key generation rate as a function of distance
for protocols with homodyne detection and an ideal phase-
sensitive amplifier with gain g = 20, and heterodyne detection
and an ideal phase-insensitive amplifier with gain g = 20
and noise N = 1, in the case of collective (main figure) and
individual (inset) eavesdropping attacks.
detector, that is from a system perspective their com-
bination is equivalent to a perfect detection apparatus.
Indeed, figure 3 shows that for large g the secret key gen-
eration rate approaches that of the corresponding perfect
detector curve.
For heterodyne detection with a phase-insensitive am-
plifier, the expression of (28) that applies to this case
tends to N in the limit of large gain. We can see
then that the combined amplifier and practical detec-
tor can be equivalently described by a noiseless hetero-
dyne detector featuring a limited efficiency η′, such that
[1 + (1 − η′)]/η′ = N . As we discussed in section III A,
for an ideal phase-insensitive amplifier, N = 1, which
leads to an equivalent detector efficiency η′ = 1. There-
fore, an ideal phase-insensitive amplifier can compensate
for all the imperfections of a practical heterodyne detec-
tor, exactly in the same way that an ideal phase-sensitive
amplifier does for a homodyne detector. In a sense, the
phase-insensitive amplifier precompensates for the inher-
ent loss due to the beamsplitter of the heterodyne detec-
tor. Their combination simulates then a perfect detection
apparatus, as shown in figure 4. Clearly, the effect of a
more realistic amplifier with N > 1 on the system perfor-
mance depends on the value of this noise. For the specific
detector parameters that we are considering, this effect
becomes negative when the noise exceeds 2.5N0.
From a practical point of view, it is also interesting to
directly compare the performance of the homodyne and
heterodyne protocols in the configurations previously dis-
cussed. In figure 5 we perform this comparison for ideal
amplifiers with gain g = 20. We observe that, despite
the improvement due to the presence of the amplifier,
the heterodyne protocol is in general more vulnerable to
system imperfections than the protocol with homodyne
9detection, under the realistic assumptions we consider in
this work. The superior performance of the homodyne
protocol is especially pronounced in the case of collective
attacks.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied continuous-variable
quantum key distribution protocols that use Gaussian
modulation of coherent states for key encoding and em-
ploy homodyne or heterodyne detection techniques. In
particular, based on an equivalent entanglement-based
scheme for this type of protocols, we reviewed the se-
curity of the homodyne protocol against individual and
collective eavesdropping attacks, and provided a secu-
rity analysis for the heterodyne protocol. In all cases,
we assumed that the eavesdropper does not have access
to Bob’s setup, and calculated the secret key generation
rates for reverse reconciliation. Subsequently, we stud-
ied the effect of adding a classical optical preamplifier
at the output of the quantum channel and inside Bob’s
apparatus to the performance of the QKD system. To
this end, we considered two types of amplifiers, an ideal
phase-sensitive amplifier and a practical phase-insensitive
amplifier, and derived the modified expressions for the
secret key generation rate for the various configurations.
We then applied these expressions to practical systems
and compared the performance of such systems under
realistic conditions.
We find that an optimal phase-sensitive amplifier can
compensate for all imperfections, such as losses and noise,
of a practical homodyne detector, and an optimal phase-
insensitive amplifier can do the same for a heterodyne
detector, thus enhancing the performance of the corre-
sponding CVQKD systems. Furthermore, our results
show that realistic noisy amplifiers can also be employed
in such systems with positive effects, as long as their noise
does not exceed a certain value that depends on the de-
tector parameters. For practical detectors and amplifiers,
this condition is in general satisfied. It is therefore clear
that overcoming the limitation imposed by the imper-
fections of realistic detectors on the secret key rate of
CVQKD systems is indeed possible using practical and
well studied devices such as optical parametric amplifiers.
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APPENDIX
We provide here the modified secret key generation
rates for the detector-amplifier configurations that
were not discussed in section III B, namely the cases
of homodyne detection with a phase-insensitive ampli-
fier and heterodyne detection with a phase-sensitive
amplifier. We also apply the results for these cases to
practical systems and discuss the performance of the
corresponding implementations.
Homodyne detection and phase-insensitive am-
plifier case: The analysis for collective attacks in this
case is essentially the same as in the case of heterodyne
detection with this type of amplifier, except for the ex-
pression for γF0G of (13), which needs to include the ap-
propriate value for v, and the expression of (23), which
is now written as
γxB
AIJFG
= γAIJFG − σTAIJFGB3HhomσAIJFGB3 (A31)
In the above expression, Hhom = (XγB3X)
MP. Tak-
ing into account these changes, we derive the symplectic
eigenvalues λ3,4 given in (15), (16), and λ5,6,7 = 1. In this
case as well, the effect of the phase-insensitive amplifier
can be included in a modified detection-added noise:
χPIA
hom
=
(1− η) + vel +N(g − 1)η
gη
(A32)
Similarly to the cases presented in section III B, the
mutual information of (1) and the Shannon information
bound of (2) remain the same, with the appropriate
modification of χhom and χtot.
Heterodyne detection and phase-sensitive am-
plifier case: For a protocol with heterodyne detection
when a phase-sensitive amplifier is added in the system,
the analysis for collective attacks leads to the expressions
of (15), (17) modified in one important way related to the
fact that the amplifier’s effect on the two quadratures is
different. Since both quadratures are measured, this fact
is taken into account by separately defining the modified
detection-added noise for quadratures x and p as follows:
χPSA,x
het
=
1 + (1− η) + 2vel
gη
(A33)
χPSA,p
het
= g
1 + (1− η) + 2vel
η
Then, the total noise is also correspondingly defined as
χx,p
tot
= χline + χ
PSA,x,p
het /T , and (17) becomes
CPSA
het
=
1
(T (V + χx
tot
)) (T (V + χptot))
× (A34)
[AχPSA,x
het
χPSA,p
het
+B + 1+
+ (χPSA,x
het
+ χPSA,p
het
)
(
V
√
B + T (V + χline)
)
+
+2T
(
V 2 − 1)]
10
DPSA
het
=
(
V +
√
BχPSA,xhet
T (V + χx
tot
)
)(
V +
√
BχPSA,phet
T (V + χptot)
)
The mutual information and Shannon information
bound of (3) and (4) are modified in a similar way. In
particular, we now have
VB =
ηT
2
[(V + χx
tot
)(V + χp
tot
)]
1
2 (A35)
VB|A =
ηT
2
[(1 + χx
tot
)(1 + χp
tot
)]
1
2
VB|E =
η
2
[(
V xE + 1
V + xE
+ χPSA,x
het
)(
V xE + 1
V + xE
+ χPSA,p
het
)] 1
2
where xE is given in section II B, and for example the last
expression has been calculated from VB|E = (V
x
B|EV
p
B|E)
1/2
with
V x
B|E =
gη
2
(
V xE + 1
V + xE
+ χPSA,x
het
)
(A36)
V p
B|E =
η
2g
(
V xE + 1
V + xE
+ χPSA,p
het
)
We then use the standard Shannon equations to derive
Ihet
AB
and Ihet
BE
.
Application to practical systems: Figures 6 and 7
show the simulation results for the above cases, under the
same conditions as the ones detailed in section III C. Sim-
ilarly to the case of heterodyne detection with a phase-
insensitive amplifier, the expression of (A32) for homo-
dyne detection with this type of amplifier tends to N
in the limit of large gain. In this case, however, the
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FIG. 6: Secret key generation rate as a function of distance for
a protocol with homodyne detection and a phase-insensitive
amplifier, for collective and individual attacks. The ‘perfect’
curve corresponds again to a perfect homodyne detector (η =
1, vel = 0) and no amplifier. The amplifier can be either
optimal (N = 1, dashed lines), or realistic (N = 1.5, full
lines).
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FIG. 7: Secret key generation rate as a function of distance
for a protocol with heterodyne detection and a phase-sensitive
amplifier, in the case of collective and individual attacks. The
‘perfect’ curve corresponds to a perfect heterodyne detector
(η = 1, vel = 0) and no amplifier.
efficiency of the equivalent noiseless homodyne detector
satisfies the relationship (1 − η′)/η′ = N , hence N = 1
leads to η′ = 0.5. Therefore, even for this optimal sce-
nario, introducing such an amplifier actually degrades the
QKD system performance, unless the homodyne detec-
tor is untypically noisy and lossy. This negative effect is
illustrated in figure 6. The case of heterodyne detection
with a phase-sensitive amplifier is more subtle, because
of the asymmetry expressed in (A33). The effect of intro-
ducing an amplifier in this case entirely depends on the
system parameters, and is positive for the parameters of
figure 7.
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